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THE LEGACY OF SOLEM V. BARTLETT: HOW COURTS 
HAVE USED DEMOGRAPHICS TO BYPASS CONGRESS 
AND ERODE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INDIAN LAW 
Charlene Koski 
Abstract: Only Congress has authority to change a reservation’s boundaries, so when 
disputes arise over whether land is part of a reservation, courts turn to congressional intent. 
The challenge is that in many cases, Congress expressed its intent to diminish or disestablish 
a reservation as long as one hundred years ago through a series of “surplus land acts.”1 To 
help courts with their task, the Supreme Court in Solem v. Bartlett2 laid out a three-tiered 
analysis. This Comment examines how courts have applied modern demographics—part of 
Solem’s third and least probative tier—and demonstrates that they have consistently and 
primarily used the factor to support finding reservation diminishment. Furthermore, in 2005, 
the Supreme Court in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation3 applied Solem’s justifications 
for considering demographics to questions of tribal tax immunity and the legal doctrines of 
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility,4 laying the groundwork for expansive use of 
demographics in other areas of Indian law. This Comment argues that courts should stop 
applying modern demographics to questions of reservation diminishment because doing so 
has led to outcomes that conflict with congressional Indian policy and undermine core 
canons of construction that have long governed the relationship between Indian tribes and 
federal courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
The reservation status of a specific piece of land has significant 
meaning for the people who live there. If a court determines Congress 
diminished (shrunk) or disestablished (terminated) a reservation, tribal 
members may suddenly find themselves answering to a different set of 
laws or having to move to maintain their tribal benefits.5 At stake in 
diminishment and disestablishment cases is the existence of the 
reservation itself. Jurisdiction issues, taxation authority, mineral rights, 
and cultural identities hinge on the outcomes. Whether a piece of land 
                                                     
1. Surplus land acts are the individual pieces of legislation Congress used around the turn of the 
twentieth century to allot individual parcels of reservation land to Indians and open the remaining 
land to white settlers. See infra Part I.B. 
2. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
3. 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
4. Id. at 221. 
5. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04[2][a] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (discussing the distinct status of tribal Indians in their own 
territory). 
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has reservation status significantly impacts how tribal, state, and federal 
governments operate, and how people on that land—Indian and non-
Indian alike—live. 
Diminishment cases generally involve the interpretation of surplus 
land acts, some of which diminished reservations and some of which did 
not.6 The starting point for analysis is straightforward: only Congress 
can diminish a reservation. Because of this, courts must determine—
using traditional Indian law canons of construction—whether Congress 
intended the surplus land act in question to shrink or terminate a 
reservation’s boundaries, or whether Congress intended to leave the 
reservation intact.7 The problem is that surplus land acts are things of the 
past—the far distant past. Most took effect about one hundred years ago. 
With Solem v. Bartlett,8 the Supreme Court sought to give courts 
some guidance.9 The case created a weighted three-tiered analysis to 
apply in questions of diminishment.10 In addition to an act’s text and the 
historical circumstances surrounding an act’s passage, Solem gave courts 
permission to examine what happened after an act took effect, including 
changes in populations as reflected by modern demographics—
specifically the ratio of Indians to non-Indians living in a given area—
for one additional clue as to whether Congress intended that area to 
remain a reservation.11 While the Solem Court urged caution when 
considering demographics, courts have unhesitatingly embraced the 
factor and used it to support finding after finding against Indian interests. 
In fact, commentators have noted that demographics predict a 
diminishment case’s outcome more accurately than any other factor.12 
This Comment argues that courts should abandon the use of 
                                                     
6. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 469 (1984) (“[I]t is settled law that some surplus land Acts 
diminished reservations and other surplus land Acts did not.” (internal citations omitted)). 
7. Id. at 470 (“The first and governing principle [in distinguishing those surplus land Acts that 
diminished reservations from those Acts that did not] is that only Congress can divest a reservation 
of its land and diminish its boundaries. . . . Diminishment, moreover, will not be lightly inferred. 
Our analysis of surplus land Acts requires that Congress clearly evince an ‘intent . . . to change . . . 
boundaries’ before diminishment will be found.”). 
8. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 470–72. 
11. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[3], at 197–98. 
12. James M. Grijalva et al., Diminishment of Indian Reservations: Legislative or Judicial Fiat?, 
71 N.D. L. REV. 415, 422 (1995) (“In a diminishment case you can have absolute certainty of result 
by checking out the demographics. If the demographics are unfavorable to Indians, they will lose.”). 
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demographics because it has led to results that contradict the Indian law 
canons of construction and Congress’s clear modern preference for tribal 
self-government. Part I offers an overview of the history of tribal 
sovereignty and the relationship between Indian nations and Congress, 
while Part II introduces a product of that history: the Indian law canons 
of construction, which require federal courts to wait for clear direction 
from Congress before abrogating Indian tribal powers. Part III explains 
the relationship between tribal sovereignty, reservation status, and Indian 
Country. Part IV introduces Solem, showing that the Supreme Court’s 
effort to synthesize a three-tiered analysis from earlier cases created the 
odd result of courts examining modern demographics to discern century-
old congressional intent. Part V shows that since Solem, courts have 
generally not used demographics to clarify ambiguities in favor of the 
Indians. Part VI introduces City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.13 In 
that case, the Supreme Court relied in part on Solem when it used 
demographics to justify using laches to bar tribal sovereignty and 
effectively diminish a reservation. The decision has the potential of 
introducing the use of demographics to other areas of Indian law. Part 
VII argues that demographics should be abandoned as a measure of 
congressional intent in diminishment cases. 
I.  INDIAN TRIBES ARE SOVEREIGN NATIONS IN A 
DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS 
Modern tribal powers and rights flow from historic principles, and 
from relationships that predate European contact with tribes.14 To decide 
questions related to tribal status and jurisdiction, courts must examine 
hundreds of years of treaties, agreements, and relationships. Thus, more 
than in many other areas of law, history is relevant in Indian law.15 This 
Part summarizes some of that history. First, it introduces the historical 
relationship between the United States and the Indians who lived on the 
land early settlers colonized. Second, it looks at the development of the 
reservation system and its significance for tribes and Indians. Finally, it 
summarizes Congress’s modern-era shift away from assimilation 
policies toward tribal self-government and cultural autonomy. 
                                                     
13. 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
14. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.01, at 8. 
15. See id. § 1.01, at 6. 
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A.  The American Relationship with Indians Developed Through Shifts 
in Strength and Loyalty, Fueled by Americans’ Unrelenting Thirst 
for Land 
Indian tribes have long been treated as sovereign nations. When 
Europeans first arrived in North America, approximately five hundred 
Indian nations lived in what is now the United States—mostly along 
coastal areas, major river systems, and near the Great Lakes16—and had 
established a commercial network spanning the continent that allowed 
them to trade food, clothing, and crafts.17 British and Spanish colonies 
negotiated treaties with them in the seventeenth century,18 and in 1763 
King George III issued a royal proclamation19 promising to protect the 
Indians’ land in gratitude for their help during the French and Indian 
War.20 
Early Americans also acknowledged the sovereign status of Indian 
tribes. To establish successful colonies, settlers needed to minimize 
conflict with neighboring Indians, who for several decades vastly 
outnumbered them.21 One of the best ways to do that was through 
promises to respect tribal land,22 so colonies passed laws protecting 
Indians from hostile non-Indians,23 and generally allowed only 
government agents to purchase Indian-claimed land.24 
Even as they worked to maintain relations, however, many colonists 
did not trust the Indians. Some Indians had helped the British win the 
French and Indian War, and colonists feared they would again side with 
the British during the Revolutionary War.25 Colonists tried to deter 
Indians by destroying their villages and crops, inadvertently motivating 
                                                     
16. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 1 (3d ed. 2002). 
17. Id. 
18. INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS 4 (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc. 
ed., 1988). 
19. The Royal Proclamation, 1763, 3 Geo. 3 (Eng.), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
18th_century/proc1763.asp, discussed in ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 28 
(2008). 
20. See PEVAR, supra note 16, at 5. 
21. See COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02[1], at 16. 
22. PEVAR, supra note 16, at 5. 
23. DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 37 (2d ed. 1986). 
24. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02[1], at 16–17. 
25. PEVAR, supra note 16, at 5. 
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most tribes to side openly with the British.26 After the Revolutionary 
War, the battered and war-weary states wanted to avoid further 
hostilities, so Congress passed laws promising that the new country 
would respect the land and sovereign powers of Indian tribes.27 Congress 
also negotiated treaties and agreements with tribes, further 
acknowledging their status as distinct sovereign bodies.28 
Agreements between Congress and Indian tribes often included 
exchanges of land rights. The first was the Treaty of Fort Pitt, or the 
Delaware Treaty of 1778,29 in which the United States agreed to build a 
fort inside the Delaware Nation to protect the tribe in return for a 
cooperative and friendly relationship.30 The Treaty also guaranteed 
members of the Delaware Nation “all their territorial rights in the fullest 
and most ample manner.”31 As treaty making progressed, the immense 
scope of the practice came to encompass land transactions of more than 
two billion acres, and individual concessions involving tens of millions 
of acres.32 
Americans’ thirst for land was insatiable. As their new nation became 
more powerful, the dynamics of the relationship between the former 
colonists and the Indians shifted.33 After the War of 1812, the British 
Empire began to withdraw, taking with it much of the tribes’ bargaining 
power.34 The United States used its military power, especially the 
cavalry, to protect prospectors and settlers moving westward onto tribal 
lands.35 Treaties were used primarily to force Indians from their land 
                                                     
26. Id. The New York Oneidas of City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, discussed infra Part 
VI, sided with the colonists. Id. 
27. Id. (explaining that examples of such laws include the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which 
declared that Indian land and property would never be taken without Indian consent, and laws 
passed in 1793 that forbade federal employees from trading with Indians, prohibited non-Indians 
from settling on Indian lands, and exempted Indians from complying with state trade regulations). 
28. 1 TREATIES WITH AMERICAN INDIANS 5 (Donald L. Fixico ed., 2008). 
29. Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.-Del. Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13. 
30. TREATIES WITH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 28, at 6–7. 
31. Treaty with the Delawares, supra note 29, art. VI. 
32. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.01, at 8–9 (discussing the scope of treaty making between Congress 
and Indian tribes). 
33. PEVAR, supra note 16, at 2. 
34. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As 
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth”—How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. 
REV. 601, 608–09 (1975) (“Prior to 1815, Indians negotiated treaties from a position of some 
power, for the tribes had the option of allying with either the United States or the British.”). 
35. PEVAR, supra note 16, at 48. 
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against their will.36 One journal article describes this period and its treaty 
negotiations: 
From the Indians’ point of view, it was a Hobson’s choice. 
Theoretically, they could keep their land and be overrun by 
white settlers. Or, they could sell their land, their ancestral 
heritage, and remove to a new site. Certainly no happy solution 
to such a dilemma could be found under the best of 
circumstances. 
 The results of treaty negotiations were almost always 
unsatisfactory to the Indians.37 
Historians have documented examples of threats, coercion, bribery, 
trickery, and outright fraud on the part of American treaty negotiators,38 
and breaches of treaty promises by the United States were common.39 
By the 1850s, Americans were excited by the prospect of a cross-
continental railroad to fuel westward expansion. Worried that railroad 
lines would need to cut through tribal territories, they began looking for 
ways to control the Indians.40 In 1851, Congress passed the first Indian 
Appropriation Act,41 expanding the federal Indian Department so that 
“Indians could be collected on reservations and looked after by the 
federal government.”42 Congress hoped that the reservation system 
would encourage Indians to adopt agriculture and other aspects of 
western lifestyle.43 Indians often expressed dislike of the reservation 
policy, claiming it favored white settlers and left tribes with small and 
otherwise inadequate land parcels.44 Even so, many tribes reluctantly 
accepted it as the only way to preserve their communities, ways of life, 
and sovereignty.45 It was during this time that “the modern meaning of 
                                                     
36. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 34, at 609–10. 
37. Id. (citations omitted). 
38. Id. at 610. 
39. Id. at 611. 
40. See ROBERT A. TRENNERT, JR., ALTERNATIVE TO EXTINCTION 49–50 (1975). 
41. Indian Appropriation Act, ch. 14, 9 Stat. 574, 586–87 (1851). 
42. TRENNERT, supra note 40, at 58. 
43. Id. at 60. 
44. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 83. 
45. Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 113, 165 (2002). Other tribes resisted, at least for a while. Eventually, however, even some of 
those tribes “actively embraced the concept when they saw their ancestral domains voraciously, and 
often illegally, taken over by squatting white settlers.” Id. 
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Indian reservation emerged, referring to land set aside under federal 
protection for the residence or use of tribal Indians, regardless of 
origin.”46 As more settlers moved west, however, Indian reservations 
increasingly served as barriers to expansion.47 Thus the federal 
government began considering the idea of land “allotments” for 
individual Indians as opposed to large concessions of land for entire 
tribes.48 
B.  By Passing the Dawes Act of 1887, Congress Aimed to Gradually 
Assimilate Indians into American Society and Use Their Land for 
Homesteading 
Tribes generally owned reservation land communally49 until Congress 
passed the General Allotment Act of 1887.50 Also called the Dawes Act, 
it was passed to assimilate Indians into the general population of the 
United States, in part by allocating to each Indian family 160 acres, 80 
acres to each individual over the age of 18, and 40 acres to each other 
single person under 18.51 After twenty-five years, the allotted land would 
belong to the Indian who received it, free of encumbrance.52 By 1885, 
the government had issued more than eleven thousand patents to 
individual lands and more than one thousand certificates of allotment53 
under laws and treaties.54  
Using land ownership to promote assimilation had been tried before 
and failed, resulting in major land scandals.55 Nonetheless, policymakers 
                                                     
46. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c][ii], at 189. 
47. GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 111. 
48. Id. 
49. INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, supra note 18, at 8. 
50. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. 
51. DELOS S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 6–7 (Francis Paul 
Prucha ed., Univ. Okla. Press 1973) (1934). 
52. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389. In 1891 the Act was amended to provide for allotments of 160 acres of 
grazing land, or 80 acres of farming land to each Indian. See Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, §§1–2, 
26 Stat. 794, 794–95. 
53. “Certificates of allotment, like receiver’s receipts under the general land laws, entitle the 
holder to exclusive possession of the premises.” Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U.S. 308, 310 
(1917). 
54. OTIS, supra note 51, at 3. 
55. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.04, at 77 (“Indian lands had been allotted as early as 1633. Many 
treaties reserved certain tracts of lands not for the tribe but for designated individual Indians or 
families under various forms of tenure. Allotment might also be tied to termination of tribal status or 
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tried again with the Dawes Act. Senator Dawes, the bill’s primary 
sponsor, argued allotment would make restitution to the Indians.56 
Others believed assimilation was necessary for “the moral improvement 
of native people and the progress of civilization.”57 Indians would need 
less land if they assimilated, others realized, leaving more for white 
homesteaders.58 
The Dawes Act, which Congress implemented through a series of 
individual acts called surplus land acts,59 did make significantly more 
land available to homesteaders.60 It gave the President authority to make 
unallotted “surplus” reservation land available to non-Indians for 
purchase and settlement.61 The end result was that between 1887 and 
1934, Indians lost two-thirds of their land; Indian land was reduced from 
138 million to 48 million acres.62 
The Dawes Act failed to meet its goals and assimilation was a dismal 
failure.63 In some cases, the allotted land was ill-adapted for farming and 
not vast enough for cattle.64 In others, Indians who lacked any skill or 
interest in farming leased their land to settlers, defeating the assimilative 
purpose of allotment altogether, as demonstrated by an 1895 report of a 
government agent who worked with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, 
describing one of the reasons allotment was failing in parts of the 
Oklahoma Territory: “Their nomadic habits militate against the 
permanent occupation of any locality as a home . . . . To live in one 
locality is repugnant to the Indian idea of home . . . . Their lavish 
hospitality militates against the accumulation of wealth by 
individuals.”65 
                                                     
elimination of tribal autonomy. These early experiments in allotment prior to the Dawes Act were 
generally recognized as failures, even by Congress. Allotted Indian lands were often lost, producing 
major national land scandals.”). 
56. OTIS, supra note 51, at 8. 
57. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.04, at 77. 
58. Id. 
59. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 106. 
60. OTIS, supra note 51 at 6–7. At first, Congress needed tribal consent to allot lands, but in 1903 
the United States Supreme Court held in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that Congress could force surplus 
land acts on Indian tribes without their consent. 187 U.S. 553, 564–68 (1903). 
61. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 108. 
62. Id. at 107. 
63. Id. at 107–09. 
64. Id. at 109. 
65. COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 243 (1895). 
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By 1934, about two-thirds of the land allotted to tribal members had 
passed by sale or involuntary transfer to non-Indians,66 and starvation 
and disease were spreading through tribal communities.67 Indians and 
their allies blamed assimilation and allotment.68 A 1928 Brookings 
Institute report exposed the deplorable living conditions of the Indians.69 
The report recommended an end to the allotment policy and encouraged 
the government to change course and promote tribal autonomy and self-
government.70 Congress responded with the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934,71 adopting many of the report’s recommendations and moving 
the country away from assimilation and allotment.72 
 C.  Modern Indian Policy Rejects Assimilation and Embraces Tribal 
Self-Government 
Congress has repudiated assimilation in favor of tribal sovereignty 
and self-government. President Lyndon Johnson expressed the modern 
approach to Indian policy when he told Congress in 1968 that the United 
States should strive to erase “old attitudes of paternalism” and promote 
“partnership self-help.”73 This shift from removal and assimilation is 
reflected in many of the laws Congress passed over the next decade 
including the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,74 and the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.75 In recent times, 
                                                     
66. COHEN, supra note 5, § 16.03[2][b]. 
67. THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (L. Meriam ed., 1928) [hereinafter Meriam 
Report], available at http://www.alaskool.org/native_ed/research_reports/IndianAdmin/Indian_ 
Admin_Problms.html. The Meriam Report is discussed in COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.05, at 84. 
68.  COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.04, at 83. 
69. See Meriam Report, supra note 67. 
70. Id.; see also INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, supra note 18, at 10. 
71. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2006)). 
72. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.05, at 84. 
73. Special Message to Congress on the Problems of the American Indian: “The Forgotten 
American,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 336 (Mar. 6, 1968). 
74. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341 (1968) (defining “Indian 
tribe” as “any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
and recognized as possessing powers of self-government” and creating an Indian Bill of Rights)). 
75. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 82 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1975) (recognizing that the 
“prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served to retard rather than enhance 
the progress of Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians of the full opportunity to 
develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-government”)). 
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Congress has consistently demonstrated respect for tribal autonomy.76 
For example, Congress allows tribes to administer programs related to 
child welfare and family services, which means tribes can tailor 
programs to their communities’ cultural needs.77 Tribes administering 
federal welfare programs “are far more likely than states to count 
education, training, and cultural activities toward mandatory work 
requirements.”78 Other examples of Congress’s support for tribal self-
government include legislation that allows the Secretary of the Interior 
to perform certain administrative acts only with the consent of a tribe,79 
and the fact that tribal courts are the initial forums to hear tribal 
jurisdiction challenges.80 Additionally, in 1966, Congress gave federally 
recognized tribes the right to sue in federal court without first gaining 
permission from the United States.81 Finally, to ensure that the passage 
of time did not prevent tribes from enforcing their property rights, 
Congress refused to enact time bars to such claims when it enacted the 
Indian Claims Limitations Act of 1982.82 
Today, Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign nations. Their sovereign 
powers are limited only by treaty or statute, or by necessary implication 
because of their dependent status.83 “Under Chief Justice John Marshall, 
the Supreme Court conceptualized an Indian treaty as a grant of rights 
from the tribe to the United States, with the tribe reserving for itself all 
                                                     
76. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01[1][c], at 210. 
77. See id. § 22.06[2][a], at 1403–06 (citing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 608(a)(7)(A) (1996) and Supplemental Security Income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1381a (1972)) 
(“Tribal control . . . allows tribes to tailor . . . programs to the unique conditions in their 
communities.”). 
78. Id. § 22.06[3], at 1406. 
79. Id. § 4.01[1][c], at 211. 
80. Id. § 4.05[1], at 275–76. 
81. Act of Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635, 80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006)) 
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe 
or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter 
in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Part of the 
statute’s intent was to allow tribes to protect their federally derived property rights. Joseph William 
Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 620 
(2006). 
82. Pub. L. No. 97-394, 96 Stat. 1966, 1976–1978 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2415 
(1966)); S. REP. NO. 96-569, at 4 (1980) (“The statute of limitations does not bar an Indian tribe, 
band, or group, an individual Indian, or the United States acting on their behalf from bringing a 
claim for title to lands.”). 
83. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
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interests not clearly ceded.”84 The principle led to the “reserved rights 
doctrine,” within which lies the notion that Indian tribes hold some 
sovereign powers and are capable of negotiating with the United States 
on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis.85 
Tribes exercise their inherent powers in many ways. For example, 
they establish their own forms of government,86 determine tribal 
membership,87 make criminal and civil laws,88 operate court systems 
with distinct procedures and structures,89 and have authority to exclude 
people from tribal territory.90 Indian governments are free to use these 
powers in ways that preserve tribal customs and traditions.91 The United 
States has encouraged this approach and the Supreme Court has 
recognized as much, observing that the United States has a duty to 
protect tribes’ rights to “self-government . . . [and] the maintenance of 
order and peace among their own members by the administration of their 
own laws and customs.”92 
II.  THE INDIAN LAW CANONS PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC 
PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
Because Indian law cases often deal with delicate issues involving the 
rights and powers of colonized native people, courts apply special 
                                                     
84. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02[2], at 123 (emphasis added). 
85. See id. § 2.02[2], at 123 (“Far from being based on the helplessness of tribal people, the 
reserved rights doctrine is based on the status of tribes as preexisting sovereigns entering into a 
government-to-government relationship with the United States.”). 
86. Id. § 4.01[2][a] (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62–63 (1978)). 
87. Id. § 4.01[2][b], at 212. 
88. Id. § 4.01[2][c], at 214. 
89. Id. § 4.01[2][d], at 217. 
90. Id. § 4.01[2][e], at 219. 
91. For example, a Rosebud Sioux court invalidated an injunction that denied a defendant access 
to her mother’s housing project because it prevented the defendant and her children from visiting 
their grandmother in violation of the concept of tiyospaye, i.e., importance of family. Moran v. 
Rosebud Hous. Auth., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6106, 6108 (Rsb. Sx. Ct. App. 1991). 
92. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883); see also Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 
383, 386–87 (1976) (denying state court jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving tribal 
members because such jurisdiction interfered with the “right of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe to 
govern itself independently of state law”); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (denying state 
court jurisdiction over a contract dispute between Indians and non-Indians on a reservation and 
noting the Court has “consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their 
reservations”); COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01[2][d], at 216. 
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canons of statutory construction that require Congress to make its intent 
clear, especially before abrogating tribal powers. The canons trace back 
to three epochal Indian law decisions by Chief Justice John Marshall.93 
This Part introduces those decisions along with the canons that resulted 
from them, and demonstrates that they complement basic democratic 
principles and allow for greater public accountability. 
It is black-letter Indian law that Congress has plenary and exclusive 
authority over Indian affairs.94 That authority comes in part from the 
Commerce Clause, which empowers Congress to regulate commerce 
“with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
tribes.”95 Judicial deference to Congress’s paramount authority in 
matters concerning Indian policy remains a central principle of the field 
of Indian law,96 and the Supreme Court has interpreted congressional 
power over Indian affairs as virtually limitless.97 
Under Chief Justice Marshall’s leadership, the Supreme Court 
decided cases involving Indian tribes in a way that recognized absolute 
congressional power, but also acknowledged the existence of tribal 
autonomy and the duty to protect tribal interests that Congress’s absolute 
power brings. Johnson v. McIntosh98 is the first of three defining 
opinions referred to collectively as the Marshall Trilogy. In it, the Court 
declined to consider moral questions raised by colonization, saying 
courts have no choice but to apply the law of their sovereign:99 
                                                     
93. The three cases are Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
94. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Washington v. Confederated Bands and 
Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979); COHEN, supra note 5, § 5.02, at 398. 
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
96. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.01[1], at 116–17. 
97. See id. (“Congress’s primacy over the other branches of the federal government with respect 
to Indian law and policy is rooted in the text and structure of the Constitution, and has been 
recognized in numerous Supreme Court decisions. . . . Judicial deference to the paramount authority 
of Congress in matters concerning Indian policy remains a central and indispensible principle of the 
field of Indian law.” (citing Lara, 541 U.S. 193)). 
98. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
99. For a discussion of some of the political considerations driving Marshall’s approach, see 
Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal 
Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1194–95 (2001), noting that “Marshall had to employ the 
harsh Anglo version of the discovery doctrine, thereby implicitly sanctioning the thesis that Indian 
tribes were ‘conquered’ merely by the arrival of Christians on their continent,” and Philip P. 
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in 
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 416–17 (1993), stating that “‘Courts of the conqueror’ 
cannot realistically be expected to invalidate even harsh colonial measures in the name of the very 
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We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, 
merchants and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract 
principles, to expel hunters from the territory they posses, or to 
contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the courts of 
the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative 
opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of 
the claim which has been successfully asserted.100 
Any limitations on conquest came from the people, not the law, the 
Chief Justice wrote: “The title by conquest is acquired and maintained 
by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, acting 
on public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the conquered 
shall not be wantonly oppressed . . . .”101 Still, the Chief Justice 
implicitly suggested that some parts of Indian sovereignty had survived 
discovery: “In the establishment of these relations, . . . . [the Indians] 
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as 
well as just claim to retain possession of it, . . . but their rights to 
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished.”102 
In the other opinions forming the Marshall Trilogy, Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia103 and Worcester v. Georgia,104 the Court confronted a long-
running dispute between the Cherokee Nation and the State of 
Georgia,105 and articulated principles that have protected tribes from the 
interference of states ever since. In Cherokee Nation, after the federal 
government failed to enforce its treaty obligations with the Cherokees, 
the tribe sued in the Supreme Court to prevent Georgia from enforcing 
laws that took Cherokee lands and suspended tribal government.106 In 
deciding to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Court declared 
                                                     
constitution established by the colonizers. How can such courts determine when Congress or the 
executive ‘goes too far’ to promote colonization? How could a decree that made such a judgment be 
enforced, in any event?” 
100. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588. 
101. Id. at 589. 
102. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
103. 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
104. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
105. The state of Georgia wanted the Cherokees removed from historical lands to which the 
United States had moved them, but the United States had repeatedly refused. In response, the state 
of Georgia “resorted to legislation, intending to force . . . the Indians from their territory.” Cherokee 
Nation, 30 U.S. at 9. 
106. Id. at 12. 
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the tribe could not be a “foreign nation” under the Constitution “because 
it is not foreign to the United States.”107 But the Chief Justice took the 
opportunity to frame the case as involving Georgia laws that “go directly 
to annihilate the Cherokee as a political society.”108 Indian tribes, Chief 
Justice Marshall declared, were more like “domestic dependent 
nations . . . in a state of pupilage; their relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”109 In describing the 
relationship as such, Marshall acknowledged the special obligations of 
protection federal authority owed the Cherokee.110 
Worcester, heard one year later, is the final case in the Marshall 
Trilogy. This time, a non-Indian sued the state of Georgia, claiming the 
state’s laws did not apply on the Cherokee reservation.111 The dispute 
allowed the Chief Justice to address many of the issues that had been 
presented in Cherokee Nation and in the process announce the core 
principles firmly rooted in Indian law even today. First, Marshall 
emphasized what he had alluded to in Johnson: that discovery gave the 
conqueror rights to acquire and settle the land it discovered, but “could 
not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal 
occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the 
memory of man.”112 When the United States succeeded Britain, it 
assumed the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship that existed between 
Britain and the Indians, and that relationship “was that of a nation 
claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful; not that of 
                                                     
107. Id. at 19. 
108. Id. at 15; see also Frickey, supra note 99, at 391–92 (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall 
used Cherokee Nation strategically to articulate principles tending to protect tribes from 
encroachments by states). 
109. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (“[Indians] look to our government for protection; rely upon 
its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their 
great father.”). 
110. See Clinton, supra note 45, at 141 (“In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall employed 
the term dependent, not as a statement of political inferiority or a statement of federal supremacy, 
but, rather, as an implied criticism of the political branches of the United States government which 
had failed to enforce the treaty obligations of protection when requested to do so by the Cherokee 
Nation. Thus, dependence for Chief Justice Marshall was not a source of federal authority over the 
Cherokee Nation. Rather, it constituted a description of a relationship created by treaty in which the 
federal government owed the Cherokee certain obligations of protection.”). 
111. The plaintiff, Samuel A. Worcester, was indicted for residing on the reservation without a 
license or permit from the state and without having sworn an oath “to support and defend the 
constitution and laws of the state of Georgia.” Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 515 (1832). 
112. Id. at 543. 
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individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting, as 
subjects, to the laws of a master.”113 
In light of this sovereign relationship, the United States negotiated 
with tribes through treaties.114 Worcester involved the Treaty of 
Hopewell of 1785,115 in which the federal government gave the 
Cherokee tribe a promise of protection in exchange for the tribe’s 
promise of peace. However, the treaty also referred to land “allotted” to 
the tribe as hunting grounds, implying that the United States was giving 
to the Cherokees, not the other way around.116 If that was true, the 
Cherokees had arguably surrendered their sovereign autonomy.117 But 
Marshall rejected that argument: “Is it reasonable to suppose, that the 
Indians, who could not write, and most probably could not read, who 
certainly were not critical judges of our language, should distinguish the 
word ‘allotted’ from the words ‘marked out?’”118 
Marshall refused to endorse a broad interpretation of the Treaty of 
Hopewell that would place the Court in the role of colonizer: 
Is it credible, that they should have considered themselves as 
surrendering to the United States the right to dictate their future 
cessions, and the terms on which they should be made? or to 
compel their submission to the violence of disorderly and 
licentious intruders? . . . Such a measure could not be “for their 
benefit and comfort,” or for “the prevention of injuries and 
oppression.” Such a construction would be inconsistent with the 
spirit of this and of all subsequent treaties. . . . It would convert a 
treaty of peace, covertly, into an act annihilating the political 
existence of one of the parties. Had such a result been intended, 
it would have been openly avowed.119 
Furthermore, the Worcester Court’s statement of congressional 
supremacy was absolute. The Chief Justice declared that the “whole 
intercourse between the United States and [the Cherokee] nation, is, by 
                                                     
113. Id. at 555. 
114. Id. at 556 (“From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to 
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians, which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and 
manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.”). 
115. Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18. 
116. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552–53. 
117. See Frickey, supra note 99, at 399. 
118. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552–53. 
119. Id. at 554. 
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our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United 
States,”120 and invalidated the Georgia laws as “interfer[ing] forcibly 
with the relations established between the United States and the 
Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled 
principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the 
government of the Union.”121 
Scholars have traced basic Indian law canons of construction back to 
Worcester.122 Today, courts applying the canons construe treaties, 
agreements, statutes, and executive orders affecting Indians liberally in 
their favor, interpret them as Indians would have understood them, and 
leave tribal property rights and sovereign powers intact unless Congress 
has clearly and unambiguously expressed an intent to abrogate or 
eliminate them.123 A court’s goal is to achieve the reasonable 
expectations of the disadvantaged party.124 The canons underscore the 
notion that Indian tribes are sovereign bodies—“domestic dependent 
nations”125 in a “unique trust relationship”126—that possess a 
government-to-government association with the United States. As a 
consequence, Congress, not the judiciary, has authority to alter an Indian 
treaty by diminishing or disestablishing a reservation.127  
III. MUCH OF A TRIBE’S AUTHORITY IS LINKED TO INDIAN 
COUNTRY STATUS AND RESERVATION BOUNDARIES 
Two basic concepts animate the law of tribal powers over land: Indian 
Country status128 and reservation status.129 Prior to 1948, the practice of 
fee patenting130 along with sales of surplus and allotted lands resulted in 
                                                     
120. Id. at 520. 
121. Id. at 561. 
122. Frickey, supra note 99, at 398. 
123. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 119 n.24. 
124. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 34, at 617–18. 
125. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
126. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985). 
127. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). 
128. See GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 338 (“The term ‘Indian country’ is the 
starting point for analysis of jurisdictional questions in Indian law, because it defines the geographic 
area in which tribal and federal laws normally apply and state laws normally do not apply.”). 
129. See DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (“If the lands in question 
are within a continuing ‘reservation,’ jurisdiction is in the tribe and the Federal Government.”). 
130. In 1906, Congress amended the Dawes Act so that instead of the federal government having 
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reservations being carved up into “checkerboards” of non-Indian and 
Indian-owned parcels, making it difficult to determine who had 
jurisdiction over any given piece of a reservation.131 To deal with that 
confusion, Congress declared in 1948 that all land within reservation 
boundaries, regardless of ownership, is “Indian Country” and under 
Indian jurisdiction.132 Indian Country includes all land inside a 
reservation’s borders, land the federal government holds in trust for 
tribes, and land allotted to individual Indians.133 Unless and until 
Congress declares otherwise, tribes and the federal government, rather 
than state governments, have jurisdiction over Indian Country.134 
Because reservation boundaries determine the Indian Country status 
of any given piece of land, an Indian tribe loses a great deal if a court 
finds Congress diminished its reservation. A tribe’s ability to exercise 
many of its sovereign powers hinges in large part on whether it is trying 
to do so in Indian Country. For example, with Indian Country status 
comes authority over zoning, building codes, health services, 
environmental controls, and other police powers.135 Tribes also have the 
                                                     
to hold allotted land in trust for twenty-five years, the Secretary of the Interior could issue 
premature fee patents to individuals who received allotted land as long as those individuals were 
deemed competent and capable of managing their own affairs. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of 
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10–11 (1995) (citing Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 
(amending § 6 of the Dawes Act) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2006)). Once such a patent was 
issued, the land was subject to alienation, encumbrance, and taxation. Id. at 11. Under pressure to 
“liberate the Indians from federal guardianship,” the government issued patents to unqualified 
allottees and allottees who neither applied for nor wanted them. Id. Even though reports at the time 
showed at least ninety percent of premature patentees lost their land, the policy was expanded in 
1917. Id. at 12. 
131. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 109–10. 
132. Indian Country Act of 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006)) 
(“[A]ll land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, . . . all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United 
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and . . . all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.”); ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 
110. 
133. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c], at 188. 
134. Id. § 3.04[1], at 182–83; see also id. § 13.01, at 890 (noting that Congress can adjust the 
definition of Indian Country for a specific purpose). 
135. Also at stake in reservation boundary disputes are services and benefits Congress has created 
for Indian tribes, including aid for education, health, welfare, business development, and natural-
resource protection. These special programs continue to be directed primarily to Indians on or near 
reservations. See INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, supra note 18, at 8. 
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legal authority to regulate the use of all reservation land, including land 
owned by non-Indians. This authority includes the power to tax,136 and 
the Supreme Court has never struck down a tribal tax of reservation land 
owned by non-Indians.137 
The location of reservation boundaries also impacts a tribe’s ability to 
claim or reclaim tribal land. Tribes that own parcels of land can petition 
the federal government to place that land in trust, which creates “tribal 
trust land,” the jurisdictional equivalent of a reservation.138 This process 
provides a way for tribes to convert real property they have acquired—or 
in some situations, reacquired after being removed—into Indian 
Country, shielding the land from further encroachment.139 The further a 
parcel of land lies from a recognized reservation, the greater scrutiny a 
trust application receives, which means that tribes with diminished 
reservations will have a more difficult time reclaiming or establishing 
reservation lands.140 
Diminishment cases often involve a plaintiff claiming either that a 
state or local government has exceeded its jurisdiction by regulating 
Indian Country, or the opposite—that the federal government exceeded 
its jurisdiction by regulating what is not Indian Country.141 These cases 
                                                     
136. COHEN, supra note 5, § 8.04[2][b], at 715. 
137. Id. § 6.02[2][a], at 515–16. 
138. Id. § 15.07[1][b], at 1010 (“Taking land into trust shields the land from involuntary loss, 
and, if the land is located outside an existing Indian reservation, establishes it as Indian country with 
all the jurisdictional consequences attaching to that status.” (internal citations omitted)). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. § 15.07[1][b], at 1011–12. 
141. For example, Seymour v. Superintendent concerned a member of the Colville Indian Tribe in 
Washington who pled guilty to attempted burglary under state law then filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus claiming his alleged crime had been committed on the Colville Indian Reservation. 
368 U.S. 351, 352 (1962). He argued that a 1906 surplus land act had not diminished the 
reservation, so the state lacked jurisdiction over his crime. Id. at 354–55. Also, Mattz v. Arnett arose 
from a disagreement between a Klamath River Indian who used gill nets to catch fish on the 
Klamath River and a California game warden who confiscated the nets, claiming a state statute 
prohibited their use. 412 U.S. 481, 484–85 (1973). The Indian sued, claiming the statute did not 
apply because he had been using the nets on the Klamath Reservation. Id. The state argued an 1892 
land surplus act had diminished the reservation. Id. In DeCoteau v. District County Court, a mother 
argued the state lacked jurisdiction to order the removal of children from her home because an 1891 
surplus land act had not terminated the reservation status of the parcels of land on which the 
removal had taken place. 420 U.S. 425, 429–31 (1975). Finally, in Wisconsin v. Stockbridge-
Munsee Community, Wisconsin claimed a casino on the Stockbridge-Munsee Reservation was 
illegal because the land it was built on was no longer a reservation. 554 F.3d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
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most often arise from disagreements over whether Congress intended to 
change a reservation’s borders through an individual surplus land act.142 
Because the acts allowed both Indians and non-Indians to own tribal 
land, one logistical concern courts face specific to diminishment 
questions is the risk of creating the very patchwork quilt of state and 
federal authority—called “checkerboard jurisdiction”—Congress was 
trying to avoid when it defined Indian Country in 1948. Courts 
considering jurisdictional questions try to avoid creating such a result.143 
IV. IN SOLEM V. BARTLETT, THE COURT ADOPTED 
DEMOGRAPHICS AS AN INTERPRETIVE TOOL 
Diminishment cases are difficult because they require courts to 
interpret congressional intent dating all the way back to the time of 
surplus land acts. For a while, courts experimented with different 
approaches to figuring out how Congress intended any one surplus land 
act to affect a particular reservation’s boundaries. Then, in the 1984 
landmark case Solem v. Bartlett, a unanimous Supreme Court 
synthesized four of its earlier decisions into a three-tiered analysis 
incorporating aspects of each case, including the use of modern 
demographics, to determine congressional intent.144 
A. The Court’s Contradictory Approach to Interpreting 
Congressional Intent in Surplus Land Acts Led to the Need for a 
Uniform Test 
Between 1962 and 1977, the Supreme Court worked to establish a 
consistent approach to interpreting surplus land acts. In Seymour v. 
                                                     
142. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[3], at 197. 
143. Courts bemoan checkerboard jurisdiction, but it is an inevitable and necessary consequence 
of the requirement that courts review congressional intent. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux v. Podhradsky, 
529 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048 (D.S.D. 2007) (“The inescapable result of the prior court decisions 
interpreting Congressional acts affecting the Yankton Sioux Reservation is that it is a checkerboard 
reservation.”); see also Singer, supra note 81, at 609 (“[I]t takes chutzpah for the Supreme Court to 
complain about the untenability of checkerboard jurisdiction when it was the Supreme Court that 
created checkerboard jurisdiction in a series of cases based on its ruling in Montana v. United States 
[450 U.S. 544 (1981)]. Those cases granted Indian nations substantial sovereign powers over their 
own lands and over non-Indians who enter tribal lands, but nearly eliminated tribal sovereign 
powers over non-Indian lands inside Indian country.”). 
144. 465 U.S. 463, 470–72 (1984). 
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Superintendent,145 the Court relied primarily on the text of a 1906 
surplus land act to find that the Colville Reservation remained intact.146 
In Mattz v. Arnett,147 decided eleven years later, the Court found that 
Congress had left the Klamath Reservation intact as well, but this time 
considered not only the text of the relevant surplus land act, but also its 
legislative history.148 In the next two cases, DeCoteau v. District County 
Court149 and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,150 the Court relied on other 
factors in addition to text and legislative history. In both DeCoteau and 
Rosebud Sioux, the Court found Congress had diminished a 
reservation.151 In DeCoteau, the Court pointed to newspaper coverage, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs documents, and the state of the tribe at the time 
of the 1889 negotiations—they were suffering from disease and failed 
harvests—to support its conclusion of consent.152 The DeCoteau Court 
also noted the area’s contemporary demographics, which were mostly 
non-Indian.153 
In Rosebud, the Court examined developments that occurred after 
Congress acted. The Court began its analysis by looking at a 1901 
agreement between the tribe and the government that would have 
diminished the reservation because it contained consent and clear 
language indicating diminishment.154 However, Congress never ratified 
that agreement and three subsequent surplus land acts that did pass 
lacked such clearly expressed intent.155 In finding congressional intent to 
                                                     
145. 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
146. See id. at 355–59. 
147. 412 U.S. 481 (1973). 
148. See id. at 495–506. The Mattz Court touched briefly on historical demographics when it 
reviewed a letter transmitted to the Committee on Indian Affairs in 1881. An infantry lieutenant, 
acting as Indian agent, suggested that the Committee’s population estimates were “gleaned 
principally from civilians, who are, I believe, somewhat inclined to lessen the number, thinking 
doubtlessly that the smaller the number the greater the likelihood of its being thrown open to 
settlers.” Id. at 499 n.21. 
149. 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
150. 430 U.S. 584 (1977). 
151. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 588. 
152. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 431–34. 
153. The Court began its statement of the facts with the contemporary demographics of the 
918,000 acres of land: “Within the 1867 boundaries, there reside about 3,000 tribal members and 
30,000 non-Indians.” Id. at 428. 
154. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 592 (“[T]he effect and intent of the 1901 Agreement, if ratified, 
would have been to change the Reservation boundaries.”). 
155. Id. at 618–20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted, “What is perhaps most 
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diminish, the Court considered language in a 1904 Presidential 
proclamation along with circumstances surrounding the acts, including 
demographic changes that followed.156 Specifically, the Court 
emphasized that “[t]he longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by the 
State over an area that is over [ninety percent] non-Indian, both in 
population and in land use, not only demonstrates the parties’ 
understanding of the meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable 
expectations.”157 The Court then decided it was “simply unable to 
conclude” that Congress’s intent “was other than to disestablish.”158 
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a strong dissent, joined by Justice 
Brennan and Justice Stewart, criticizing the Court’s decision in Rosebud 
as “wholly unjustifiable,”159 and warning that its ramifications “may 
extend to a large number of other reservations throughout the Nation.”160 
For Justice Marshall, the case was a departure from long-standing Indian 
law canons of construction: “[B]y holding against the Tribe when the 
evidence concerning congressional intent is palpably ambiguous, [the 
Court] erodes the general principles for interpreting Indian statutes.”161 
B. In Solem v. Bartlett, the Court Established a Three-Tiered Analysis 
Incorporating the Early Diminishment Cases and Establishing 
Demographics as an Interpretive Tool 
In Solem v. Bartlett, the Court wrangled the four earlier diminishment 
cases into a single comprehensible framework.162 Solem incorporates 
                                                     
striking about the Rosebud Acts . . . is the absence of any express provision disestablishing the 
Reservation.” Id. at 618. Specifically, the acts that passed lacked language indicating the 
government would pay the tribe a fixed-sum amount for its land. Id. at 587 (majority opinion). The 
Court reasoned, however, that the language used was “substantially equivalent” to that used in the 
acts at issue in DeCoteau. Id. at 588. 
156. Id. at 588, 602–03, 605–06 (“Having determined that the 1904 Act carried forth the intent to 
disestablish which was unquestionably manifested in the 1901 Agreement, our examination of the 
1907 and 1910 Acts is made easier. None of the parties really disputes that the intent of the three 
Acts was the same.”). 
157. Id. at 604–05. 
158. Id. at 605. 
159. Id. at 617 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 618. 
162. See 465 U.S. 463, 470–72 (1984). For a more detailed discussion on the conflicts between 
these cases, see Susan D. Campbell, Reservations: The Surplus Land Acts and The Question of 
Reservation Disestablishment, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 69 (1984). 
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factors from each of the four cases to create a three-tiered analysis for 
determining whether Congress intended a surplus land act to diminish a 
reservation. The analysis first considers an act’s plain language, then the 
circumstances surrounding the act’s passage, and finally what happened 
after the act took effect, including modern demographics. 
The Court began with a statement of absolute congressional power 
over Indian lands, and the corollary principle of absolute judicial 
deference: “[O]nly Congress can divest a reservation of its land and 
diminish its boundaries. Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian 
reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual plots 
within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until 
Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.”163 For the Court, these 
principles meant a reaffirmation of the traditional Indian law canons of 
construction: “Diminishment . . . will not be lightly inferred. Our 
analysis of surplus land Acts requires that Congress clearly evince an 
intent to change boundaries before diminishment will be found.”164 
The first tier of the Court’s framework was the plain language of the 
congressional act, which the Court considered “[t]he most probative 
evidence of congressional intent.”165 The second tier was the act’s 
legislative history and events surrounding its passage, which might 
reveal evidence that “Congress shared the understanding that its action 
would diminish the reservation, notwithstanding the presence of 
statutory language that would otherwise suggest reservation boundaries 
remained unchanged.”166 The Court said that if courts fail to find 
“substantial and compelling evidence” of congressional intent to 
diminish after considering those first two factors, they should stop their 
inquiry and leave the reservation intact.167 If a lower court found such 
evidence, however, it could look for “one additional clue” of 
congressional intent by examining what happened after Congress acted, 
                                                     
163. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. The Court described certain phrases in surplus land acts as important. Explicit reference 
to “cession” or other language “evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests,” 
combined with language indicating that Congress had agreed to unconditionally pay tribes for the 
opened land, create an “almost insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the tribe’s 
reservation to be diminished.” Id. at 470–71. 
166. Id. at 471. 
167. Id. at 472. 
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including changes in demographics.168 
The Court acknowledged that relying on demographic history was an 
“unorthodox and potentially unreliable” method of statutory 
construction, but defended the factor as a “necessary expedient,”169 
because during the time of surplus land acts, “various factors kept 
Congress from focusing on the diminishment issue.”170 The Court also 
argued that the factor created “practical advantages,”171 defending the 
assertion that: 
When an area is predominately populated by non-Indians with 
only a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments, finding that 
the land remains Indian country seriously burdens the 
administration of state and local governments. Conversely, 
problems of an imbalanced checkerboard jurisdiction arise if a 
largely Indian opened area is found to be outside Indian 
country.172 
The Court concluded by emphasizing that federal courts would not 
use unorthodox interpretive tools to diminish a reservation without first 
having found strong evidence from more traditional sources: 
There are, of course, limits to how far we will go to decipher 
Congress’ intention in any particular surplus land Act. When 
both an Act and its legislative history fail to provide substantial 
and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to 
diminish Indian lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude 
for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place 
                                                     
168. Id. at 471–72. 
169. Id. at 472 n.13. 
170. Id.; see also id. at 468 (“The notion that reservation status of Indian lands might not be 
coextensive with tribal ownership was unfamiliar at the turn of the century.”). For a criticism of this 
historical analysis, see Campbell, supra note 162, at 96. Campbell argues that Congress omitted 
explicit language of cession from surplus land acts because leaving reservations intact aided the 
implementation of allotment, provided a backup system in case allotment failed or the Indians 
rebelled, and perhaps also protected Indians from settlers and state authorities. Id. 
171. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
172. Id. at 471–72 n.12 (internal citations omitted) (citing DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 
U.S. 425 (1975); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)); see also id. at 471 (“On a 
more pragmatic level, we have recognized that who actually moved onto open reservation lands is 
also relevant to deciding whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. Where non-Indian 
settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian 
character, we have acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred.” 
(citing DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428; Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 588 n.3, 604–05)). 
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and that the old reservation boundaries survived the opening.173 
Applying the new analysis to the Cheyenne River Act,174 the Solem 
Court found that Congress had left the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation intact.175 After finding some evidence of congressional 
intent to diminish in the text and surrounding circumstances, the Court 
analyzed the reservation’s modern demographics: “The strong tribal 
presence in the opened area has continued until the present day. Now 
roughly two-thirds of the Tribe’s enrolled members live in the opened 
area. The seat of tribal government is now located in a town in the 
opened area, where most important tribal activities take place.”176 The 
Court also observed that the population of the disputed area was evenly 
divided between Indian and non-Indian residents, making it “impossible 
to say that the opened areas of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation 
ha[d] lost their Indian character.”177 
Some commentators have noted that even though the Solem Court 
cautioned against relying exclusively on demographics, it seemed to do 
just that in an effort to maintain the reservation’s borders: 
The logical relationship between the question of what Congress 
meant when it legislated many years ago and the ethnicity of the 
people who now live on or near the reservation has always been 
attenuated, at best. [Solem] is brimming with self-consciousness 
over the very suggestion of a link between the two. . . . Oddly 
enough, in the face of all this apprehension about using present 
demography as a tool in statutory construction, in the end it is 
about the only thing that the Court found “clear” . . . .178 
At the time, one commentator noted that the Court’s use of 
subsequent events and demographic changes to measure congressional 
intent “might have produced the right result in Solem,” but “ha[d] the 
potential of producing wrong results in many surplus land cases.”179 
                                                     
173. Id. at 472. 
174. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460.  
175. Solem, 465 U.S. at 481. 
176. Id. at 480. 
177. Id. 
178. Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to 
Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 789–90 (1996). 
179. Campbell, supra note 162, at 71. 
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V. SINCE SOLEM, COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY USED 
DEMOGRAPHICS TO FIND DIMINISHMENT 
Since Solem, the Supreme Court has decided two diminishment cases: 
Hagen v. Utah180 and South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe.181 In both 
cases, the Court ruled against the tribe; and in both cases, it relied in part 
on modern demographics to do so. Other federal courts that have 
considered modern demographics in diminishment cases have also 
consistently ruled against tribes. The few courts since Solem that have 
left reservations intact have not relied on demographics to do so.182 
A. The Supreme Court Has Considered Diminishment Twice Since 
Solem and Both Times it Used Demographics to Find Against 
Indian Tribes 
Hagen v. Utah involved the Uintah Indian Reservation and two 
surplus land acts.183 One, from 1902, said the reservation would be 
allotted if the tribe consented (which it did not);184 the other, from 1905, 
actually opened the reservation to non-Indians without tribal consent 
after the Supreme Court in 1903 held it was constitutional to do so.185 
The state argued that read together, the 1902 and 1905 acts showed 
congressional intent to diminish the reservation.186 The Supreme Court 
                                                     
180. 510 U.S. 399 (1994). 
181. 522 U.S. 329 (1998). 
182. This Comment’s analysis is representative, not exhaustive. For example, Part V discusses a 
Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000), which held a 
reservation had not been diminished without considering demographics, but not an Eighth Circuit 
case, Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1296–98 (8th Cir. 1994), in 
which the court applied Solem’s test to reconsider its prior decision to leave the Fort Berthold 
Reservation intact and upheld its earlier ruling. The Eighth Circuit decision reversed a district 
court’s consideration of “population and fee ownership patterns” to determine a certain part of the 
Reservation was “de facto” excluded from most aspects of tribal jurisdiction. Duncan Energy, 27 
F.3d at 1298. The court called “this exclusive reliance on the third Solem factor to create a quasi-
diminishment totally inappropriate.” Id. 
183. 510 U.S. at 403–07. The case arose after the State of Utah charged Hagen with distribution 
of a controlled substance in 1989. Id. at 408. Hagen entered a conditional plea of guilty, arguing that 
the crime had occurred on the Uintah Indian Reservation. Id. The State argued it had jurisdiction 
because Congress diminished the reservation in 1905. Id. 
184. The 1902 act never took effect. Id. at 404–08, 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
185. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567–68 (1903). 
186. Brief for the Respondent at 23–25, Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (No. 92-6281), 1993 
WL 384805, at *23–25. 
Koski_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 11/23/2009 12:52 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:723, 2009 
748 
first considered text in the 1902 act that said unallotted lands “shall be 
restored to the public domain.”187 Turning to historical circumstances, 
the Court determined that a contemporaneous understanding existed that 
once the 1905 Act opened the land to non-Indians there would be no 
“outside boundary line to this reservation.”188 The Court held that both 
factors—text and historical circumstances—pointed toward intent to 
diminish.189 
The Court next considered modern demographics, noting that about 
eighty-five percent of the land’s population was non-Indian, and that the 
largest city in the area was about ninety-three percent non-Indian.190 For 
the Court, those numbers “demonstrate[d] a practical acknowledgement 
that the Reservation was diminished; a contrary conclusion would 
seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the 
area.”191 
Dissenting, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority had abandoned 
the Indian law canon of construction requiring courts to interpret 
ambiguities in favor of the Indians,192 and that its decision was 
                                                     
187. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 404. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority’s reliance 
on the “public domain” language ignored Solem’s conclusion that “the public domain is an 
ambiguous concept that is not incompatible with reservation status.” Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
188. Id. at 417 (quoting the federal inspector who negotiated the act as saying that after the 
surplus land act takes effect, “there will be no outside boundary line to this reservation”). 
189. Id. at 420. Legal scholars have disagreed with Hagen’s conclusion. See, e.g., Rebecca 
Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do Indigenous Peoples Fit 
Within Civil Society? 5 PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 381 (2003) (“In Hagen v. Utah, the Supreme Court 
examined possibly the most ambiguous record of Congressional intent to date . . . . While [Justice] 
O’Connor purported to apply the same three-part test articulated in Solem v. Bartlett, which 
examined the statutory language, the historical context of a Surplus Land Act, and who actually 
moved onto the opened land, it became apparent that the Court’s primary concern was over the 
governance of many non-Indians in the area.”). 
190. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 420–21. 
191. Id. at 421 (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604–05 (1977)). 
192. Id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that both the statutory text 
and surrounding circumstances were ambiguous and that those ambiguities should be interpreted in 
favor of the Indians. Id. at 422–24. He emphasized that the Court focused its textual analysis on the 
1902 act, which never went into effect, and that the term “public domain,” which the majority 
pointed to as language suggesting diminishment, was removed from the 1905 act, which actually 
did take effect. Id. at 422, 427–30, 433–38. Even if one assumed the majority’s position that such 
language suggested intent to diminish, the removal of that language indicated Congress’s intent to 
not diminish the reservation, he argued. Id. at 436–38. He also offered examples of sentences the 
federal inspector spoke over six days of negotiations that indicated the tribe members would be 
“deprived of no privileges you have at the present time,” and that they would maintain jurisdiction 
 
Koski_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 11/23/2009 12:52 PM 
Demographics, Diminishment, and Indian Law 
749 
unsupported by precedent: “Although the majority purports to apply 
these canons in principle . . . it ignores them in practice.”193 For the 
dissent, checkerboard jurisdiction was the consequence of a deliberate 
congressional policy decision: 
Nothing in the “face of the Act,” its “surrounding 
circumstances,” or its “legislative history” establishes a clear 
congressional purpose to diminish the Uintah Reservation. I 
appreciate that jurisdiction often may not be neatly parsed 
among the States and Indian tribes, but this is the inevitable 
burden of the path this Nation has chosen. Under our precedents, 
the lands where petitioner’s offense occurred are Indian country, 
and the State of Utah lacked jurisdiction to try him for that 
crime.194 
The Supreme Court’s next diminishment decision was South Dakota 
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe.195 Tribal, state, and federal officials disagreed 
over whether environmental regulations applied to a solid waste disposal 
facility located within the Yankton Sioux Reservation’s original 1858 
boundaries. The State of South Dakota argued that Congress had 
diminished the reservation in a surplus land act from 1894.196 The Court 
found that the plain language of the 1894 act clearly indicated 
congressional intent to diminish the reservation,197 and that the historical 
                                                     
over their land. Id. at 432. 
193. Id. at 424. Justice Blackmun stated that the majority had resolved “every ambiguity in the 
statutory language, legislative history, and surrounding circumstances in favor of the State and 
imputing to Congress, where no clear evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent to diminish 
the Uintah Valley Reservation.” Id. 
194. Id. at 442 (internal citations omitted). 
195. 522 U.S. 329 (1998). 
196. Id. at 333. 
197. Id. The Court first looked to the statutory language of the act, which provided that the tribe 
would “cede, sell, relinquish and convey” to the United States all unallotted land on the reservation 
and the federal government would compensate the tribe by paying a lump sum of $600,000, about 
$3.60 per acre. Id. at 338. However, the act also contained a savings clause that said the 1894 act 
left “all provisions of” the 1858 act in “full force and effect.” Id. at 338–39. The savings clause 
made the 1894 Act “undeniably ambiguous.” See A.J. Taylor, Note, A Lack of Trust: South Dakota 
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe and the Abandonment of the Trust Doctrine in Reservation Diminishment 
Cases, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1163, 1183 (1998) (“Even if articles I and II [of the 1894 Act] indicate a 
congressional intent to terminate, the article XVIII savings clause confounds such an assessment 
and makes the 1894 Act undeniably ambiguous. The savings clause constitutes the strongest such 
clause of any unallotted land sale agreement between a tribe and the United States in history.”). The 
Court, however, decided that “[t]he unconditional relinquishment of the Tribe’s territory for 
settlement by non-Indian homesteaders [in the 1894 act] can by no means be reconciled with the 
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circumstances also indicated a “contemporaneous understanding that the 
proposed legislation modified the reservation.”198 
The Court next turned to demographics, and noted that less than one-
third of the population was Indian.199 The tribe argued that data indicated 
a rising Indian population, and pointed out that the tribe was the area’s 
largest employer.200 The Court reviewed evidence presented by the tribe, 
but was not persuaded, concluding that “the area remains predominately 
populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian 
allotments, and those demographics signify a diminished reservation.”201 
B. Federal Courts Considering Diminishment Since Solem Have 
Consistently Failed to Use Demographics to Favor Indian Tribes 
Since Solem, federal courts presented with demographic evidence 
suggesting even larger Indian populations than the Solem Court 
considered have consistently failed to use that evidence to support 
maintaining a reservation’s borders. 
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie,202 one of the first 
diminishment cases decided by a federal circuit court after Solem, 
involved a coal-mining company’s challenge to a tribe’s tax authority.203 
The area’s demographic makeup was undeniably Navajo: Indians made 
up ninety percent of the population.204 About fifty-five percent of the 
land surface was either owned by the tribe and tribal members, or held in 
                                                     
central provisions of the 1858 Treaty, which recognized the reservation as the Tribe’s ‘permanent’ 
home and prohibited white settlement there,” and that such an “absurd conclusion” supported a 
finding of diminishment. Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 345–46. 
198. Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 352. 
199. Id. at 356. 
200. Brief for the Respondents Yankton Sioux Tribe and Darrell E. Drapeau at 18, South Dakota 
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581), 1997 WL 593862, at *18. 
201. Id. at 356–57 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 
(1984)). The Court remanded Yankton Sioux to the district court, with instructions to decide whether 
the reservation had been entirely disestablished. Id. at 358. After further proceedings, including an 
appeal to the Eighth Circuit and another remand, it was decided in 2007 that the reservation 
continues to exist, but is significantly diminished from the original 1858 reservation boundaries. See 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010, 1030 (8th Cir. 1999); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. 
Pohradsky, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (D.S.D. 2007). 
202. 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1990). 
203. Id. at 1388–89. 
204. Id. at 1419. 
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trust for them.205 The tribe also leased twenty percent of the area’s land 
from the federal government.206 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals diminished the reservation after 
studying the text of the surplus land act and the surrounding 
circumstances of its passage. It did not consider the strong Navajo 
presence, explaining that it “need not linger over the subsequent 
demographics of the area” because it had already found compelling 
evidence of diminishment.207 The court concluded that it would not 
“‘remake history’ and declare a de facto reservation in the face of clear 
congressional intent to the contrary.”208 
More recently, in January 2009, the Seventh Circuit, in considering 
acts from 1871 and 1906, relied primarily on circumstances surrounding 
the acts’ passage and subsequent events to diminish and then disestablish 
the reservation of the Stockbridge-Munsee Community,209 even though 
the statutory language lacked a clear expression of congressional 
intent210 and the tribe had submitted evidence that the land’s population 
was sixty-three percent Indian.211 In their briefs, the parties had 
disagreed over what “demographics” meant, but the court did not 
address the issue.212 In a short concurring opinion, Judge Kenneth Ripple 
emphasized that the court was not abandoning the Indian law canon that 
only Congress can change or disestablish a reservation’s boundaries, or 
Solem’s finding that explicit language holds the most probative value 
because, “the unique historical context [of the case at hand] makes it 
                                                     
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1419–20. 
207. Id. at 1419. 
208. Id. at 1420 (citing DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 449 (1975)). 
209. Wisconsin v. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 554 F.3d 657, 664 (7th Cir. 2009). 
210. Id. at 663. 
211. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants the Stockbridge-Munsee Community and Robert 
Chicks at 14, Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 554 F.3d 657 (No. 04-3834), 2008 WL 1756378, at *14. 
212. See Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants the Stockbridge-Munsee Community and Robert 
Chicks at 23, Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 554 F.3d 657 (No. 04-3834), 2008 WL 2066506, at *23 
(“[T]he State does not dispute that the demographics of the two-township Reservation compare very 
favorably to cases in which the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts have found no diminishment or 
disestablishment. The State nevertheless attempts to gerrymander a more limited ‘disputed area’ (by 
excluding lands reacquired by the Tribe) to skew the population statistics. The ‘disputed area,’ 
however, is the entire two-township Reservation. See, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 480 (treating the 
disputed area as the entire area alleged to have been diminished). Thus, the demographics, and the 
problems of checkerboard jurisdiction, weigh heavily in the Tribe’s favor.” (some internal citations 
omitted)). 
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unreasonable for us to demand a clearer statement in the statutory 
language.”213 
United States v. Webb214 is one case decided since Solem that rejected 
diminishment.215 However, the court did so without considering 
demographics. At issue was whether the Nez Perce Reservation in Idaho, 
established by an 1863 treaty, was diminished or disestablished by an 
1893 surplus land act.216 Applying Solem’s test, the court concluded that 
when “both an act and its legislative history fail to provide substantial 
and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to diminish Indian 
lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to 
rule that diminishment did not take place . . . .”217 
The Ninth Circuit held that the plain text of the 1893 Act failed to 
suggest Congress intended to diminish the reservation because it lacked 
any mention of a change in reservation boundaries and contained a 
savings clause to preserve the land rights created by an earlier treaty.218 
The court cited language in Mattz acknowledging that Congress knew 
how to require termination or disestablishment of reservations by 
express language in surplus land acts when it wanted to, and concluded 
it had not done so in the case at hand.219 
Next, the court turned to surrounding circumstances. After finding 
that the circumstances surrounding the 1894 Act disclosed “nothing to 
impeach the district court’s findings” rejecting diminishment,220 the 
court considered subsequent events, including documented post hoc 
references to the “former” reservation.221 It found that the bulk of that 
                                                     
213. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 554 F.3d at 665. The “unique historical context” was essentially 
that, unlike the surplus land acts which were designed to open land to white settlers and to 
encourage the assimilation and integration of the tribes into white society, the purpose of the 1871 
Act was to provide economic benefit to the tribe and to open lands to lumbering interests for the 
legal harvesting of timber. Wisconsin v. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 366 F. Supp. 2d 698, 765 
(E.D. Wis. 2004). The Act also addressed the long-standing conflict between two tribal factions, the 
Indian party and the Citizen party, and treated them in different ways. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 
554 F.3d at 659−60. 
214. 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 
215. Id. at 1138. 
216. Id. at 1131. 
217. Id. at 1132 (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 (1984)). 
218. Id. at 1135. 
219. Id. at 1135 (citing Mattz v. Arett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973)). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 1137 n.15. 
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evidence consisted of events that occurred after ratification, “the 
category deemed least probative by the Supreme Court” in Solem, and 
that the references created an ambiguity that Indian Law canons demand 
be resolved in favor of the tribe.222 
VI. IN SHERRILL V. ONEIDA THE SUPREME COURT USED 
DEMOGRAPHICS TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF LACHES 
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation223 the Supreme Court 
expanded Solem’s use of demographics beyond the realm of 
diminishment. It did so by pointing to the diminishment cases224 to 
support its use of laches to prevent a tribe from asserting its sovereign 
right to reservation land.225 
The case’s controversy was rooted in a conflict more than two 
hundred years old. In the years after the Revolutionary War, New York 
began purchasing sections of three hundred thousand acres of Oneida 
reservation, ignoring the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua in which the 
United States acknowledged the Oneida’s reservation and guaranteed the 
tribe “free use and enjoyment” of that land.226 Early Washington 
administrations objected to the state’s actions, but later administrations 
pursued a policy to open reservation lands to white settlers.227 In short, 
the Oneidas were forced to abandon their land. Many ended up on a 
reservation in Wisconsin and their New York reservation eventually 
dwindled to just thirty-two acres.228 In the mid-twentieth century, the 
Oneidas began seeking some form of remedy.229 
                                                     
222. Id. The category of subsequent events also includes demographics, which the Ninth Circuit 
noted but did not specifically consider. Id. at 1132 (acknowledging that Solem’s “far less probative” 
category of subsequent events includes Congress’s treatment of the affected area as well as “who 
settled in the area and subsequent demographic history”). In Yankton Sioux, the Supreme Court had 
considered similar evidence and found diminishment. Id. at 1133. However, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished Webb in part because the land in question was allotted as opposed to unallotted. Id. 
223. 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
224. Id. at 215 (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604–05 (1977) and Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S 399, 421 (1994) to support consideration of “jurisdictional history” and “the current 
population situation” in using the doctrine of laches). 
225. Id. at 211. 
226. Id. at 204–05. 
227. Id. at 206. 
228. Id. at 207. 
229. Id. at 207–08. 
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In 1951, the Oneidas of Wisconsin and those remaining in New York 
sought redress for lands New York had acquired between 1795 and 
1846. The Indian Claims Commission found that the federal government 
had breached its fiduciary duty to ensure the Oneidas received 
conscionable consideration from New York for the land in question.230 
Before the case could go any further, however, the Oneidas asked for its 
dismissal. They had decided to pursue legal action against local 
governments instead.231 
The tribe filed a test case in 1970 against the New York counties of 
Oneida and Madison.232 It asked for damages in the form of fair rental 
value for the years 1968 and 1969 of 872 acres of land occupied by the 
two counties.233 The case went to the Supreme Court on a jurisdictional 
issue and, in Oneida I, the Court held the Oneidas could sue in federal 
court.234 The case was then heard in the lower federal courts and 
eventually made its way back to the Supreme Court, which in Oneida II 
held the Oneidas could maintain their claim to be compensated “for 
violation of their possessory rights based on federal common law.”235 
The Supreme Court left open the question of whether equitable 
considerations should limit the relief available.236 
In 2000, the Oneidas filed a second case.237 This time, the tribe sought 
to recover land it had not occupied for about two hundred years and to 
eject twenty thousand private landowners.238 The district court refused, 
saying the situation “cr[ied] out for a pragmatic approach.”239 The court 
agreed that the Oneidas might recover some type of compensation, but 
held that ejection went too far.240 
Rebuffed in their attempt to eject private landowners, the Oneidas 
used money they collected through their casino to purchase some of the 
                                                     
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 208. 
232. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1972). 
233. Id. at 920. 
234. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661, 682 (1974). 
235. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226, 236 (1985). 
236. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 209 (2005). On remand, Oneida 
was awarded $15,994 from Oneida County and $18,970 from Madison County. Id. 
237. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
238. Id. at 61–62. 
239. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 211 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation, 199 F.R.D. at 92). 
240. Id. at 210–11. 
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land that had been illegally taken in 1805.241 Some of that land was 
located within the City of Sherrill’s limits—specifically two parcels 
containing a gas station and convenience store—so the city wanted the 
tribe to pay taxes.242 But when the city sent the tribe a property-tax bill 
for about $3,000, the tribe refused to pay, claiming it had sovereign 
immunity against such taxes because the land it had purchased was 
within its reservation borders.243 Only Congress, not the courts, could 
strip the tribe of that immunity, it argued.244 The city sued for eviction, 
setting the stage for Sherrill.245 
Supporters on both sides emphasized matters of fairness. Sherrill’s 
city manager, for example, argued it was unfair for one local business to 
pick and choose what taxes it would pay.246 Other counties said that 
Indians, who made up less than one percent of the population, had 
bought more than 16,000 acres of land in the area costing the counties 
about $1.5 million in lost property taxes and $8 to $10 million in lost 
sales taxes that other taxpayers had to make up.247 
Daan Braveman, a law professor at Syracuse University told the New 
York Times that the situation signified the “Catch-22” that Indians face: 
“Their sovereignty is not a divisive issue only as long as they remain too 
poor and powerless to do anything with it.”248 As for the argument that 
too much time had passed, Harry R. Sachse, a lawyer in Washington 
who represents various tribes, opined in the same article that the 
argument itself was unfair because the Oneidas had been wronged 
during a time when they faced serious barriers to remedies.249 He argued 
that they should not be penalized just because “enough time goes by.”250 
The tribe and U.S. government maintained their claim that because 
the Court in Oneida II had recognized the Oneidas’ title to their 
reservation and because the tribe had purchased the land in question 
                                                     
241. See Brief for Petitioner at 9, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 1057 (2005) 
(No. 03-855), 2004 WL 1835364, at *9. 
242. Id. at 9–10. 
243. Peter Applebome, A Land Deal, A Tax Bill And a Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at 23. 
244. Brief for Respondents at 9, Sherrill, 544 U.S. 1057 (No. 03-855), 2004 WL 2246333, at *9. 
245. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 198 (2005). 
246. Applebome, supra note 243, at 23. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
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(which was within the reservation boundaries) on the open market, the 
tribe had sovereign immunity from taxation.251 Since Congress had not 
revoked that immunity, the tribe should not have to pay taxes to the City 
of Sherrill.252 
In the district court, city attorneys had asked to brief the equitable 
doctrine of laches, hoping to argue that too much time had passed 
without tribal presence on the land. The court denied the motion, holding 
that laches “is not an available defense in actions brought by Indians, or 
by the United States on behalf of Indians, to protect their rights to their 
lands.”253 The Second Circuit affirmed that decision, so no record on 
laches was ever developed.254 On the merits, both lower courts sided 
with the tribe, finding that the parcels in question were within the 
reservation boundaries and that the relevant surplus land act had left the 
reservation intact.255 
The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on laches.256 The 
Court declined to address the issue of diminishment, deciding the case 
instead under the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility,257 
holding that it had been too long since the tribe had first relinquished its 
governmental interest in the land for it to claim sovereignty.258 
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of the area’s modern 
demography: “According to the 2000 census, over 99% of the 
population in the area is non-Indian: American Indians represent less 
than 1% of the city of Sherrill’s population and less than 0.5% of Oneida 
County’s population.”259 The justices reasoned that an Oneida victory 
                                                     
251. Brief for Respondents at 12, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) 
(No. 03-855), 2004 WL 2246333, at *12. 
252. Id. 
253. Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 259 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). 
254. Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing at 1–2, Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197 (No. 03-855), 2005 WL 
959687, at *1–2. 
255. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 212. 
256. Id. at 214 n.8 (citing SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a)). For the Court, the lack of briefing on the issue was 
not a concern: “the question of equitable considerations . . . is inextricably linked to, and is thus 
‘fairly included’ within, the questions presented.” Id. 
257. Id. at 215. The Court explained that the appropriateness of relief awarded to the Oneidas 
must be evaluated in light of the long history of state sovereign control over the territory. Id. The 
properties involved “have greatly increased in value since the Oneidas sold them 200 years ago. 
Notably, it was not until lately that the Oneidas sought to regain ancient sovereignty over land 
converted from wilderness to become part of cities like Sherrill.” Id. 
258. Id. at 218. 
259. Id. at 211. 
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would create the “disruptive practical consequences” that the 
impossibility doctrine is designed to avoid.260 The Court set the stage for 
its discussion of the equitable doctrines by explicitly comparing the 
“different, but related, context of the diminishment of an Indian 
reservation”:261  
This Court has observed . . . that “[t]he longstanding assumption 
of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90% non-
Indian, both in population and in land use,” may create 
“justifiable expectations.” . . . Similar justifiable expectations, 
grounded in two centuries of New York’s exercise of regulatory 
jurisdiction, until recently uncontested by [the Oneida Indian 
Nation], merit heavy weight here.262 
The Court further reasoned that 25 U.S.C. § 465, which authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior to acquire land in trust for Indians and specifies 
that such land will be exempt from state and local taxation, provided the 
proper avenue for the Oneidas.263 While the Court agreed with the tribe 
that the property fell within the boundaries of its reservation, it 
nonetheless upheld the city’s taxing authority.264 The claim to a 
sovereign’s exclusive legal rights does not survive eternally, it 
decided.265 Allowing the tribe to exercise its taxation immunity would be 
a remedy that stretched into the future, a result the Court rejected.266 
In dissent, Justice Stevens lamented that the Court had crossed into 
Congress’s territory.267 He asserted: 
                                                     
260. Id. at 219 (citing Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357 (1926) and 
concluding that “the unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sovereign control, even 
over land purchased at the market price, would have disruptive practical consequences similar to 
those that led this Court in Yankton Sioux to initiate the impossibility doctrine.”). 
261. Id. at 215 (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604–05 (1977); Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S 399, 421 (1994) (“‘[J]urisdictional history’ and ‘the current population situation . . . 
demonstrat[e] a practical acknowledgement’ of reservation diminishment”; “a contrary conclusion 
would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area . . . .”)); see also 
id. at 219–20 (referring to Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471–72 n.12 (1984)). 
262. Id. at 215–16 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). 
263. Id. at 221. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 221 n.14. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that both sides had agreed 
throughout the case that if the tribe’s properties were within the reservation’s boundaries, “the City 
has no jurisdiction to tax them without express congressional consent,” id. at 223, and that Congress 
had in fact already spoken on the issue of sovereign tax immunity and reconfirmed it with respect to 
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[T]he Court has ventured into legal territory that belongs to 
Congress. Its decision today is at war with at least two bedrock 
principles of Indian law. First, only Congress has the power to 
diminish or disestablish a tribe’s reservation. Second, as a core 
incident of tribal sovereignty, a tribe enjoys immunity from state 
and local taxation of its reservation lands, until that immunity is 
explicitly revoked by Congress.268  
By ignoring those principles, he argued: 
[T]he Court has done what only Congress may do—it has 
effectively proclaimed a diminishment of the Tribe’s reservation 
and an abrogation of its elemental right to tax immunity. Under 
our precedents, whether it is wise policy to honor the Tribe’s tax 
immunity is a question for Congress, not this Court, to decide.269 
In a motion for a rehearing, the tribe’s attorneys asked for a chance to 
brief the issue of laches.270 They argued that the Court erred in finding 
acquiescence: “[T]he Court’s opinion must be read to fault the Oneidas 
for failing to sue the State or local governments before repurchasing 
land. But the Court did not consider whether such suits were 
possible.”271 The tribe could not have sued in federal court for immunity 
before possessing the land in question,272 and Congress had forbidden 
state courts from hearing such suits.273 “In short, this Court’s crucial 
                                                     
the reservation lands of the New York Indians, id. at 224–25. He pointed to the fact that in 
providing New York state courts with jurisdiction over civil actions between Indians, Congress had 
emphasized that the statute was not to be “construed as subjecting the lands within any Indian 
reservation in the State of New York to taxation for State or local purposes.” Id. at 224 n.4 (citing 
25 U.S.C. § 233 (2000)). 
268. Id. at 223–24. 
269. Id. at 224–25. 
270. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 254, at 4. 
271. Id. at 4; see also Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A 
Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 
TULSA L. REV. 5, 14–15 (2006) (“[T]he Oneidas’ ability to sue the federal government was 
dependent on the United States’ consent pursuant to the establishment of the Indian Claims 
Commission in 1946. In short, the Oneidas, in joining in the 1893 litigation and suing the United 
States as early as 1951, were doing all that could reasonably be expected of an Indian tribe to 
address allegations of illegal dispossession of property.”). For a discussion of this and other barriers 
the Oneidas faced in bringing suit, see generally Singer, supra note 81. 
272. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 254, at 4 (arguing that the tribe would have been 
prevented from pursuing a claim in federal court for several reasons, including the Eleventh 
Amendment bar against suing a state in federal court). 
273. Id. 
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premise of available but foregone remedies does not stand up when 
examined concretely,” the tribe argued.274 Finally, the tribe argued that 
the Court would benefit from briefing about congressional intent: 
When Congress, in the 1960s through 1980, statutorily 
authorized tribal possessory actions, it pointedly refused to enact 
time bars, and it did so fully aware that the lands subject to tribal 
possessory and treaty claims had been in non-Indian hands and 
under non-Indian jurisdiction for many years. This Court, in its 
current opinion, did not consider how its policy judgment that it 
is too late for the Oneidas to assert tax immunity (on land 
purchased from willing sellers) can be squared with Congress’ 
evident judgment not to bar “ancient” claims to possessory and 
treaty rights.275 
Indian law scholars have railed against Sherrill as a dangerous 
precedent that will allow courts to dismiss tribal claims for reasons 
related to equity without applying substantive law.276 One scholar took 
special issue with the Court for saying the tribe could seek federal trust 
status: 
The Court is prolonging the “dependent” state of Indian nations 
by forcing them to seek shelter from the federal government—
by necessitating taking land back into trust status—during a time 
when at least some Indian nations finally have the resources to 
begin to act as independent, albeit unique, sovereigns. . . . 
Today, the Court forces the dependent status to continue, despite 
the repudiation of colonialism and its moral underpinnings that 
we allegedly embrace.277 278 
                                                     
274. Id. at 5. 
275. Id. at 5–6 (internal citation omitted). 
276. See Singer, supra note 81, at 611–12. Singer argues that in relying on laches, “the Court 
ignores certain facts—facts that are well-known to those versed in federal Indian law, as the 
Supreme Court certainly should be. A number of principles of both jurisdiction and substantive law 
barred the Oneidas from suing either the state of New York or the United States until the 1960s, and 
New York’s sovereign immunity may bar suit even today. These facts make it ludicrous to blame 
the Oneida Indian Nation for waiting too long to file a lawsuit to recover the lands illegally 
transferred to the state of New York in the early 19th Century.” Id. See also Krakoff, supra note 
271, at 10 (“City of Sherrill . . . flings open the doors of equitable discretion. . . . [L]itigants will ask 
courts to dismiss tribal claims grounded in historical wrongs more frequently, and courts will grant 
those requests for dismissal more frequently. The substantive law is relatively untouched, but it will 
rarely be applied.”). 
277. Krakoff, supra note 271, at 18. 
278. In April 2005, one month after the Court issued Sherrill, the tribe filed an application with 
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VII.  COURTS SHOULD ABANDON DEMOGRAPHICS AS A 
MEASURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Courts should stop using demographics to measure congressional 
intent in diminishment cases. Since Solem offered its reluctant 
endorsement of demographics as a tool for deciphering congressional 
intent, the factor has been applied consistently against Indian interests 
and the canons of construction meant to protect them. This Part explains 
the political and legal consequences of the Supreme Court assuming a 
legislative role and argues that with Sherill, the Court laid the 
groundwork for expanding the negative effects of demographics beyond 
diminishment into other areas of Indian law. 
A. Consideration of Demographics in Diminishment Cases Has Led to 
the Erosion of Canons That Protect Tribal Sovereignty, Further 
Democratic Principles, and Ensure Public Accountability 
While courts considering questions of diminishment often begin by 
reciting the Marshall Court’s special canons of construction, they tend to 
apply them halfheartedly. This is unfortunate because despite their 
controversial roots,279 the canons of construction serve a vital purpose 
beyond statutory construction. They promote core national values about 
American relations with Indians by emphasizing the special trust 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes and 
placing decision-making authority regarding that relationship with the 
representative branch. Keeping authority for Indian affairs squarely with 
Congress, as opposed to the judiciary, provides for greater 
accountability. 
Chief Justice Marshall understood that federal courts would be 
powerless to prevent many of the grave injustices that would occur as a 
result of colonialism and conquest, and that it would ultimately be up to 
the electorate to hold the “Conqueror” to standards of “humanity.”280 Yet 
                                                     
the Department of the Interior requesting the United States take into trust 17,370 acres located in 
Madison and Oneida counties, including the land at issue in the Supreme Court case. The 
Department announced it would take 13,004 acres of the land into trust. U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, FACT SHEET CONCERNING THE RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE ONEIDA INDIAN NATION 
OF NEW YORK’S LAND-INTO-TRUST APPLICATION, available at http://www.oneidanationtrust.com/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=ROD. 
279. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
280. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823) (“The title by conquest is acquired and 
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the Chief Justice also knew that federal courts would necessarily be “the 
courts of the conqueror”281 in any dispute between the U.S. Government 
and Indian nations. The canons were designed in part to ensure that 
federal courts, despite being courts of the conqueror, would never have 
to serve as colonizers on behalf of land-hungry Americans pushing ever 
more forcefully onto the frontier.282 Instead, under the canons, courts 
must wait for Congress to act. Congress alone can restrict tribal 
sovereignty through express legislation.283 Courts decide the 
constitutionality of that legislation. This approach, rooted in federalism 
and separation of powers, has the positive effect of forcing debate about 
American Indian policy into Congress, the most representative branch of 
the federal government, where the nation’s most difficult ethical 
controversies are debated and decided. 
When courts act without a clear expression of congressional intent, 
they run the risk of perpetuating a history of colonialism that by its 
nature contradicts democratic principles and which the American people 
have decidedly abandoned. When courts take it upon themselves to 
decide American Indian policy in lieu of the people’s elected 
representatives, they effectively remove an important regulator on 
colonialism: public opinion. Public opinion regarding American Indian 
policy has changed significantly since Chief Justice Marshall penned his 
Indian law trilogy. Congress has over the last fifty years abandoned 
assimilation and embraced tribal self-government and cultural 
autonomy. It has decided that certain powers, including tax immunity, 
promote those goals.284 The Court, by using demographics as an 
interpretive tool, has undermined that clearly expressed intent to move 
Indian policy in a different direction. 
Since Solem’s endorsement of modern demography, courts have 
primarily used the tool to reach results more in line with the goals of 
                                                     
maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, acting on public 
opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed.”). 
281. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
282. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588 (“The British Government . . . whose rights have passed to the 
United States, asserted a title to all the lands occupied by Indians . . . . These claims have been 
maintained and established . . . by the sword . . . . It is not for the courts of this country to question 
the validity of this title, or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.”); see also supra Part II. 
283. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (“[T]he whole intercourse between the 
United States and [the Cherokee] nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government 
of the United States.”). 
284. See supra Part I.C. 
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assimilation than self-government. When an area is occupied mostly by 
non-Indians, courts point toward Solem’s demographic considerations to 
support diminishment.285 Yet when an area is occupied primarily by 
Indians, courts decline to consider demographics at all or dismiss them 
as bearing little weight.286 Even more troubling, this often occurs after a 
court has interpreted arguably ambiguous statutory text and surrounding 
circumstances in favor of non-Indians, despite Indian law canons 
demanding the opposite approach.287 
In fact, demographic considerations have been used to support a 
string of decisions diminishing the very tribal sovereignty the Indian law 
canons of construction aim to protect. The canons exist in recognition of 
the special sovereign status tribes hold and to ensure Congress—not 
courts—plays the colonial role of “Conqueror” described by Justice 
Marshall.288 They reflect the notion that the relationship between tribes 
and the federal government is sovereign-to-sovereign and exist to 
prevent erosion of that relationship.289 It is difficult to think of a more 
attenuated measure of congressional intent than the changing racial 
composition of a particular piece of land over the last century.290 When 
courts apply such an elusive tool to help decide whether an Indian tribe 
retains its reservation—despite canons assigning Congress sole authority 
over a reservation’s borders and demanding that courts interpret 
ambiguities in favor of the Indians—they undermine democratic values 
and goals, and the canons designed to guard them. 
B. With Sherrill, the Supreme Court Expanded the Problematic Use of 
Demographics Beyond Solem and Diminishment 
The Sherrill Court barred the Oneidas from exercising their sovereign 
tax immunity because too much time had passed.291 It pointed to changes 
                                                     
285. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (concluding that 
sixty-six percent non-Indian population supported diminishment); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 419 
(1994) (concluding that eighty-five percent non-Indian population supported diminishment). 
286. See, e.g., Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1419 (10th Cir. 
1990) (explaining the court “need not linger over the subsequent demographics of the area” showing 
the area’s population was ninety percent Indian). 
287. See, e.g., supra notes 187, 189, 192–93 and accompanying text, and supra note 197. 
288. See supra Part II. 
289. See Frickey, supra note 99, at 417. 
290. See, e.g., supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. 
291. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005). 
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in the area’s demographics to frame and support that decision.292 In 
doing so, the Court catapulted the demographic justifications expressed 
in Solem from their already uneasy place in diminishment cases to 
entirely new areas of Indian law including taxation immunity, laches, 
acquiescence, and impossibility. Such a shift seems contrary to what the 
Solem Court had in mind when it offered reluctant approval of the 
“unorthodox and potentially unreliable” tool.293 
In Sherrill, the Court looked only to Solem’s justifications for using 
demographics—to avoid the administrative burdens of checkerboard 
jurisdiction—without considering the opinion’s caveats.294 In doing so, 
the Court essentially disregarded Solem’s entire demographic context. 
For example, the Court failed to consider that in Solem, it only turned to 
demographics in the first place because of inherent ambiguities 
surrounding surplus land acts.295 Such ambiguities did not exist in 
Sherrill. 
In direct conflict with Solem, the Sherrill Court placed “heavy 
weight” on the land’s demographic composition,296 emphasizing the 
area’s primarily non-Indian population to justify a decision to block the 
tribe’s tax immunity, effectively diminishing their reservation.297 The 
Sherrill Court used the diminishment cases and their reasoning to 
support this move, but not once does its opinion mention the Indian law 
canons, or the caution and reluctance the Solem Court stressed. Instead, 
the Sherrill Court cited Rosebud and Hagen to support a conclusion that 
“the current population situation” is something courts may consider 
when determining questions of tribal jurisdiction. 298 Thus, the Court laid 
the groundwork for expansive use of an analytical tool that leads to 
unjust results, places courts in the role of Marshall’s “Conqueror,” and 
undermines societal and congressional values. 
                                                     
292. See supra notes 259–62 and accompanying text. 
293. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 n.13 (1984); see also supra Part IV.B. 
294. See supra Part VI. 
295. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra notes 261–62 and accompanying text. 
297. See Singer, supra note 81, at 611 (“The result [of Sherrill] is a rather extraordinary situation. 
The Indian nations situated in New York may have title to hundreds of thousands of acres in that 
state but no rights over the land they own. The non-Indian trespassers have all the property rights 
associated with ownership, even though they lack the formal title . . . it is very unusual—actually, it 
is bizarre—to have legal title to property but no rights in the property whatsoever.”). 
298. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 215 (2005). 
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Courts should abandon the use of modern demographics in the 
diminishment context before Solem’s “unorthodox and potentially 
unreliable” tool shifts even further from its original context, 
undermining the Indian law canons of construction and leading to the 
gradual destruction of tribes’ sovereignty and their ability to self-govern. 
CONCLUSION 
Only Congress has the authority to diminish a reservation’s 
boundaries. In using modern demographics to interpret ambiguities in 
century-old congressional intent, courts are bending legal principles and 
rules to find diminishment where congressional intent is unclear. In 
continuing to use demographics to combat policy concerns that might 
arise from declaring a non-Indian community a reservation, courts are 
acting as legislative bodies, not judicial ones. In doing so, they 
jeopardize the basic principles that govern Indian law, both within the 
realm of diminishment and without. 
 
